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Abstract
The paper develops a formal theory of the degree
of justification of arguments, which relies solely on
the structure of an argumentation framework. The
theory is based on a generalisation of Dung’s no-
tion of acceptability, making it sensitive to the num-
bers of attacks and counter-attacks on arguments.
Graded generalisations of argumentation semantics
are then obtained and studied. The theory is applied
by showing how it can arbitrate between competing
preferred extensions and how it captures a specific
form of accrual in instantiated argumentation.
1 Introduction
A Dung argumentation framework [Dung, 1995] relates ar-
guments by binary conflict-based attacks. The sceptically
justified arguments are those in the intersection (respectively
union, if credulously justified) of sets (extensions) of ‘accept-
able’ arguments evaluated under various semantics (see [Ba-
roni et al., 2011] for an overview). The arguments and at-
tacks may be assumed to be defined by an instantiating set of
logical formulae (theory); the claims of justified arguments
thus identifying the instantiating theory’s non-monotonic in-
ferences. Extensions are evaluated based on the principle that
if an argument a is not attacked, then a is justified. If a is
attacked by an un-attacked b, then b is justified, a rejected. If
an un-attacked c attacks b, then b is rejected, and c reinstates
a as justified (c defends a), and so on.
Context and objectives In prominent developments of
[Dung, 1995], an attack from b to a may not succeed, if a
is preferred to b (e.g., [Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002; Modgil
and Prakken, 2013]), or because an attack’s weight may fall
below a numerical threshold [Dunne et al., 2011]. In the
so-called equational approaches (e.g., [Egilmez et al., 2013;
Gabbay and Rodrigues, 2012]) attacks succeed to a given
quantifiable degree, based on the propagation of numerical
values assigned to arguments and/or attacks,which then deter-
mine the degree to which arguments are justified. The above
developments rely on exogenously given qualitative or quan-
titative information to decide, or give more refined accounts
of, the justification status of arguments. However, one can in-
tuitively refine the notion of justification based on the number
of attacks on an argument. For example, consider an argu-
ment g, which consists of two sub-arguments concluding that
a suspect had opportunity and motive, and defeasibly extends
these sub-arguments to conclude the presumed guilt of a sus-
pect. The level to which g (and the presumption of guilt) can
be said to be justified, is intuitively lessened in the case that
counter-arguments to the suspect’s motive and opportunity
can be established (i.e., g is attacked on the conclusions of
both its sub-arguments) as compared with a counter-argument
to only one of motive or opportunity (g is attacked on only
one sub-argument).
This paper sets out to generalise Dung’s theory so as to dif-
ferentiate levels of justification of arguments, by relying only
on the structure of the Dung graph, and without relying on
any exogenous information. We do so by formalising the two
following principles. Everything else being equal, (A1) the
greater the number of attacks on an argument b, the weaker
is b’s level of justification, in which case the attacking argu-
ments can be said to ‘accrue’ in weakening b. Thus if b is at-
tacked by c and c′, both un-attacked, then b has a lower justifi-
cation than when attacked by c alone. This in turn means that
if a is attacked by b, then a is more strongly justified when
defended by c and c′’s attacks on the weakened b, than when
a is defended by c alone. Hence, all else being equal, (A2)
the larger the number of arguments defending a, the stronger
is a’s level of justification, in which case the defending argu-
ments can be thought of as ‘accruing’ in strengthening a.
Outline of the paper In Section 2 we review Dung’s the-
ory. Section 3 then generalises Dung’s notion of the de-
fense/acceptability of a by a set of arguments X , by grad-
ing defense with respect to the number of arguments at-
tacking and defending a. This yields a ranking among
types of defense. Section 4 then generalises Dung’s stan-
dard semantics, so that extensions are graded with respect
to the attacks and counter-attacks on their contained argu-
ments. These semantics—which we call graded—are shown
to generalise Dung’s theory and are studied with respect
to the existence and computation problems. This makes it
possible to rank arguments according to how strongly they
are justified under different graded semantics. Section 5
then shows two applications of the graded semantics to ar-
bitrate between multiple preferred extensions, and to AS-
PIC+ argument instantiations. Section 6 concludes and com-
pares our work with other formalisms ranking arguments
based only on their interactions [Besnard and Hunter, 2001;
Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005; Matt and Toni, 2008;
Wu and Caminada, 2010; Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2013].
The section argues that our approach is the first to generalise
all the standard concepts and semantics of Dung’s theory to
novel graded variants, yielding a more fine grained notion of
acceptability-based justification. Proofs do not pose partic-
ular challenges and make use of standard techniques (e.g.,
fixpoint theory). They are omitted for space reasons.
2 Abstract Argumentation
We review Dung’s abstract argumentation theory [Dung,
1995] in terms of its fixpoint theory presentation, as this pro-
vides a natural set up for pursuing the objectives of the paper.
Definition 1 (Frameworks). An argumentation framework
(AF ) ∆ is a tuple 〈A,〉 where A 6= ∅, and  ⊆ A2 is a
binary attack relation on A. Notation a  b denotes that a
attacks b, and X  a denotes that ∃b ∈ X s.t. b  a. Sim-
ilarly, a  X denotes that ∃b ∈ X s.t. a  b. An AF such
that for each a ∈ A the cardinality | {b | a   b} | of the set of
attackers of a is finite, is called finitary.
An argument a ∈ A is said to be acceptable w.r.t. X ⊆ A,
if any argument attacking a is attacked by some argument in
X , in which case X is said to defend a. An AF ’s character-
istic function, applied to some X ⊆ A, returns the arguments
defended by X [Dung, 1995]. We call this function the de-
fense function.
Definition 2 (Defense Function). The defense function d∆ :
℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for ∆ = 〈A,〉 is defined as follows. For
any X ⊆ A:
d∆(X) = {x ∈ A | ∀y ∈ A : IF y  x THEN X  y}
An argument a ∈ A is not attacked by a set X ⊆ A if no
argument in X attacks a. One can define a function which,
applied to some X ⊆ A in an AF , returns the arguments
that are not attacked by X . This function was introduced in
[Pollock, 1987], and we refer to it as neutrality function.
Definition 3 (Neutrality Function). The neutrality function
n∆ : ℘(A) −→ ℘(A) for ∆ = 〈A,〉 is defined as follows.
For any X ⊆ A: n∆(X) = {x ∈ A | NOT X  x} .
One can define the extensions, and hence the justified argu-
ments, of an AF ∆ under Dung’s semantics, in terms of the
fixpoints (X = d∆(X) and X = n∆(X)) or post-fixpoints
(X ⊆ d∆(X) and X ⊆ n∆(X)) of the defense and neutrality
functions as follows:1
Definition 4 (Semantics). Let ∆ = (A,), X ⊆ A. Then:X
is a conflict-free extension of ∆ iff X ⊆ n∆(X); X is an ad-
missible extension of ∆ iff X is conflict-free and X ⊆ d(X);
X is a complete extension of ∆ iff X ⊆ n(X) and X =
d(X); X is a stable extension of ∆ iff X = n(X); X is the
grounded extension of ∆ iff X is the smallest complete exten-
sion of ∆; X is a preferred extension of ∆ iff X is a largest
complete extension of ∆.
For semantics S ∈ {complete, grounded, stable, preferred},
a ∈ A is credulously, respectively sceptically, justified under
S, if a is in at least one, respectively all, S extensions of ∆.
1Henceforth, the subscript ∆ indexing d and n will be omitted.
Finally, we recapitulate some well-known properties of the
defense and neutrality functions that will be of use later:
Fact 1. [Dung, 1995] Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF and
X,Y ⊆ A. The following holds:
X ⊆ Y =⇒ d(X) ⊆ d(Y )
X ⊆ Y =⇒ n(Y ) ⊆ n(X)
d(X) = n(n(X))
Recall also that for a finitary AF , iterating (up to ω) the
application of d∆ from ∅ yields the least fixed point of d∆
(grounded extension) [Dung, 1995].
3 Graded Defense
In argumentation the justified status of an argument depends
on the status of its attackers, which in turn depends on the
status of their attackers, and so on. The recursive nature of
argumentation semantics is neatly captured by the fixpoint
constructs of Definition 4. We now refine this notion of sta-
tus building on the simple assumptions that, all else being
equal: (A1) having fewer attackers is ‘better’ than having
more; (A2), having more defenders is ‘better’ than having
fewer. It is important to observe right away that Dung’s se-
mantics are consistent with these assumptions as having no
attackers is a sufficient condition for being justified under any
semantics, and having no defenders is a sufficient conditions
for being rejected under any semantics.
We proceed as follows. First we define a generalisation
of the notion of defense that accounts for the above assump-
tions. Then we define variants of Dung’s semantics and of the
notion of justifiability based on this new notion of defense.
Finally we use these semantics to ‘rank’ arguments in a way
that does not use exogenous information (such as preferences
or weights) and only relies on the argumentation framework.
3.1 Graded Defense and Neutrality Functions
Let us illustrate our guiding intuitions with a few examples.
Keep in mind that an argumentation framework represents all
information available for the evaluation of the status of its
arguments.
Example 1. In Figures 1i) – 1iv), the encircled set Xi de-
fends ai (i = 1 . . . 4) under Dung’s Definition 2. However we
can differentiate all these cases based on the number of at-
tackers and defenders of ai. For instance, X2 more strongly
defends a2 in ii) than X1 defends a1 in i), as a2 is defended
by two arguments whereas a1 is defended by one argument.
Hence by A2, a2 has a ’stronger status’ than a1. However, il-
lustrating A1, a3 in iii) is attacked by two arguments as com-
pared with the single attack on a1. Hence a3 has lower status
than a1. Note that each of a1 and a3 are defended against
each individual attack by a single defending argument; hence
the number of attackers differentiates between the two cases.
Now, take an argument a and a set of arguments X . Let
m be the number of a’s attackers (b1, . . . , bm) and, for each
bi (0 ≤ i ≤ m) let ni be the number of attackers of bi (i.e.,
counter-attackers of a) in X . Finally, let n be the minimum
among the nis, i.e., n = min({ni}0≤i≤m). So all attackers
of a have at least n counter-attackers, and integers m and n
a1
b1
c1 a2
b2
c2d2 a3
b3
e3d3
c3
a4
b4
e4
c4
f4
d4
i) ii) iii)
iv)
{a2}
{c1, c2 , d2 , d3 , e3 , e4 , f4, g4} 
{a1}
{a3} {a4}
{b1 , b3 , c3 , c4}
{b2 , b4 , d4}
a
vi)
b1
b2
c1
c2
v)
X1 X2 X3
X4
g4
Figure 1: i)–iv) Xi∈{1...4} defending a1, . . . a4; v) example
framework; vi) Hasse diagram ranking arguments in i)–iv).
encode information about how strongly a is defended by X .
We can now generalise Definition 2 as follows:
Definition 5 (Graded defense). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF
and let m and n be two integers. Then:
dm
n
(X) = {x | @≥my : [y  x AND @≥nz : z  y AND z ∈ X]}
where ∃≥nx, for integers n (‘there exists at least n x’) are the
standard first-order logic counting quantifiers.
So, dm
n
(X) is the set of arguments which do not have at
least m attackers (i.e., which have at most m − 1 attackers)
that are not counter-attacked by at least n arguments inX . To
illustrate, in Figure 1, a1 ∈ d1
1
(X1) and a2 ∈ d1
1
(X2) since
in both cases: it is not the case that one or more arguments
attacking a1, respectively a2, are not attacked by one or more
defending arguments in X1 (X2). However if we increment
n by 1: a2 ∈ d1
2
(X2) but a1 /∈ d1
2
(X1) since it is the case
that one or more arguments attacking a1 are not attacked by
two or more arguments in X1.
Definition 6 (Graded neutrality function). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉
be an AF and let m be any integer. Then: nm(X) =
{x ∈ A | @≥my : y  x AND y ∈ X} .
The following fact shows that graded defense and neutral-
ity are well-behaved generalisations of the standard defense
and neutrality (Section 2) as they inherit their properties.
Fact 2. For any AF ∆ = 〈A,〉, the following holds:
d1
1
(X) = d(X) (1)
n1(X) = n(X) (2)
X ⊆ Y =⇒ nm(Y ) ⊆ nm(X) (3)
X ⊆ Y =⇒ dm
n
(X) ⊆ dm
n
(Y ) (4)
nm(nn(X)) = dm
n
(X) (5)
m
n
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
Figure 2: Partial ordering on graded defense functions (with
0 < m,n). The horizontal and vertical axes consist of the val-
ues ofm and, respectively, n. Arrows go from worse to better
functions. Dashed lines (diagonals) denote incomparability.
Equation (1) reformulates d(X) as the set of arguments for
which it is not the case that there are one or more attackers,
which are not counter-attacked by one or more arguments in
X; that is, no attacker is not attacked by some argument in
X . So does Equation (2) for n(X). The remaining formulae
generalise Fact 1 to the graded setting.
Fact 3. For any AF ∆ = 〈A,〉, X ⊆ A, and m,n < ω:
nm(X) ⊆ nm+1(X) (6)
dm
n
(X) ⊆ dm+1
n
(X) (7)
dm
n
(X) ⊇ d m
n+1
(X) (8)
Intuitively, Formula (6) states that the set of arguments at-
tacked by at most m arguments in X is included in the set of
arguments attacked by at most m + 1 arguments in X . For-
mulae (7) and (8) result from combining this with the fact that
dm
n
is the composition of nm with nn (Formula (5)).
3.2 Ranking Graded Defense Functions
With the notion of graded defense we can give a mathemat-
ically precise formulation of our two driving assumptions.
Fix a set of arguments X .
• (A1): The less attackers that are not counter-attacked by
n defending arguments in X the better (for some fixed
n). Therefore, for m < t we have that belonging to
dm
n
(X) is ‘better’, w.r.t. X , than belonging to d t
n
(X).
• (A2): For all m attackers (for a fixed m), the more
counter-attacks from arguments in X , the better. There-
fore, for t < n we have that belonging to dm
n
(X) is
‘better’, w.r.t. X , than belonging to dm
t
(X).
Graded defense functions can be viewed as different ‘types’
or ‘standards’ of defense/acceptability. They can be ordered
according to the following relation:
Definition 7. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF . Define:
dm
n
 ds
t
⇐⇒ m ≤ s AND t ≤ n (9)
The relation is depicted in its generality in Figure 2. Ex-
pressions dm
n
ds
t
may be read as follows: ‘being mn -defended
is preferable over being st -defended’ or ‘the
m
n -defense func-
tion is at least as strong as the st -defense function.
Fact 4. Relation  is: i) reflexive, antisymmetric and transi-
tive (a partial order); ii) and if dm
n
 ds
t
, then for all X ⊆ A,
dm
n
(X) ⊆ ds
t
(X).
Claim ii) states that being defended by a stronger defense
function is logically more demanding than being defended
by a weaker one. This is in line with the intuition that if
an argument meets a demanding standard of defense it also
meets a less demanding one.
Referring to the framework in Fig.1v), we illustrate
Formula (7) and Fact 4: d1
1
({c1, c2}) = {c1, c2, b2}
⊆ d2
1
({c1, c2}) = {c1, c2, a, b2} ⊆ d3
1
({c1, c2}) =
{c1, c2, a, b1, b2}. We also illustrate Formula (8) and Fact 4
with reference to Figure 1ii): d1
1
({d2, c2, a2}) = {d2, c2, a2}
⊇ d1
2
({d2, c2, a2}) = {d2, c2, a2} ⊇ d1
3
({d2, c2, a2}) =
{d2, c2}.
Since the relation  is a partial order some functions may
be incomparable (see Figure 2) and this, we claim, is intuitive.
Example 2. (Example 1 continued) In iv), a4 has three at-
tackers, and so by A1 a3 in iii) would be stronger than a4.
On the other hand, every attacker of a3 is defended by only
one argument, whereas two attacks on a4 are defended by two
arguments, and so by A2, a4 would be stronger than a3. So
a3 and a4 appear to be incomparable.
Further principles along A1 and A2 could be assumed in
order to force  to become total. A natural one, which we
refrain from studying in detail in this paper, is (A3): if a set
of arguments is mn -defended and another one is
s
t -defended,
where m < s and n < t (i.e., they are incomparable w.r.t.
) then the first one is more strongly defended because it has
fewer attackers. Therefore, for m < s and n < t, belonging
to dm
n
(X) is ‘better’ than belonging to ds
t
(X). One could
then redefine  as follows: dm
n
 ds
t
iff either m < s or,
m = s and n ≥ t. This is nothing but a lexicographic order
on graded defense functions, first based on their number of
attackers, and then on their number of defenders.
3.3 Ranking Arguments by Graded Defense
The same recursive principles underpinning standard Dung’s
semantics can be used to characterise how strongly the set
of arguments defended by a given set, defends another set,
and how the latter set defends yet another set, and so forth.
That is to say, given a set X that mn -defends all its contained
arguments, one can iteratively apply dm
n
to X .
Let us fix some terminology. For α ordinal, the α-fold
iteration of dm
n
with m and n integers is denoted by dαm
n
.
For a given X , an infinite iteration generates an infinite se-
quence, or stream, d0m
n
(X), d1m
n
(X), d2m
n
(X), . . .. A stream
‘stabilizes’ if and only if there exists an ordinal α such that
dαm
n
(X) = dα+1m
n
(X). Such a set dαm
n
(X) is then called the
limit of the stream. Since dm
n
is monotonic (Fact 2) such a
limit always exists by the Knaster-Tarski theorem. In finitary
argumentation frameworks a limit is reachable in a countable
number of steps and we can define the indefinite iteration of
function dm
n
as: d∗m
n
(X) =
⋃
0≤i<ω d
i
m
n
(X).
Iterated graded defense can thus rank arguments:
Definition 8. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be a finitary AF and X ⊆ A.
For a, b ∈ A, we define that a is ‘at least as justified as’ b w.r.t
X as follows:
a X b⇐⇒ ∀m,n ≥ 0 IF b ∈ d∗m
n
(X) THEN a ∈ d∗m
n
(X)
The strict part X is defined in the usual way.
The key intuition behind this definition is the following
one. Take two arguments a and b, and some fixed set X . Is it
the case that every time b is defended through the iteration of
some graded defense function, a also is? If that is the case,
it means that (w.r.t. X) every standard of defense met by b is
also met by a, but a may satisfy yet stronger ones (recall Fact
4). By Definition 8 it is easy to see that X is a partial order.
Example 3. Let us rank, by iterated defense w.r.t ∅, the ar-
guments in Figure 1i-iv). Applying Definition 8 we obtain the
partial order shown in Figure 1vi). Note that we assume one
single AF ∆ consisting only of the arguments and attacks
shown in Figures 1i-iv). Under standard Dung’s semantics
all arguments in
⋃4
i=1Xi, are in the iterated application of
d∆ to ∅ (i.e., in the grounded extension of ∆). We can differ-
entiate amongst these arguments. As expected the best argu-
ments are those with no attackers. Second-best is a2 whose
attackers are all counter-attacked by two un-attacked argu-
ments. Then a1, since a2 ∈ d∗1
2
(∅) but a1 /∈ d∗1
2
(∅) (and so
a1 ∅ a2), but ∀m,n: if a1 ∈ d∗m
n
(∅) then a2 ∈ d∗m
n
(∅) (and
so a2 ∅ a1). We then have that a3 and a4 are incomparable
(cf. Example 2). Formally, a3 ∈ d∗3
3
(∅) and a3 /∈ d∗2
2
(∅), but
a4 /∈ d∗3
3
(∅) and a4 ∈ d∗2
2
(∅). Critically, we can also differen-
tiate amongst the rejected arguments (those not in the Dung
grounded extension). Thus b1, b3, c3, c4 are ranked above
b2, b4, d4.
Definition 8 allows one to rank arguments by the quality
of the iterated defense they obtain from a given set. We will
see that, depending on the nature of the given set X , and the
relative size of n and m, Definition 8 relates in a precise way
to the ranking of arguments w.r.t. graded generalisations of
Dung’s semantics, to which we turn in the next section.
4 Graded Semantics
4.1 Generalising Dung’s semantics
We now generalise Definition 4 as follows:
Definition 9 (Graded Extensions). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an
AF , X ⊆ A, and m and n be integers. Then: X is m-
conflict-free iff X ⊆ nm(X); X is an mn-admissible exten-
sion of ∆ iff X ⊆ nm(X) and X ⊆ dm
n
(X); X is an mn-
complete extension of ∆ iff X ⊆ nm(X) and X = dm
n
(X);
X is an m-stable extension of ∆ iff X = nm(X); X is
the mn-grounded extension of ∆ iff X is the smallest mn-
complete extension of ∆; X is an mn-preferred extension of
∆ iff X is a largest mn-complete extension of ∆.
For S ∈ {mn-complete, mn-grounded, m-stable, mn-
preferred}, a ∈ A is credulously, respectively sceptically jus-
tified under semantics S, if a is in at least one, respectively
all, S extensions of ∆.
We henceforth assume the sceptical definition when refer-
ring to an argument as being justified. For a given semantics,
we can rank the justification status of an argument with re-
spect to a given framework, exactly like we did in Definition
8 for iterated graded defense:
Definition 10 (Ranking arguments by graded semantics). Let
∆ = 〈A,〉 be an AF . For a, b ∈ A, and for S ∈ {mn-
complete, mn-grounded, m-stable, mn-preferred}:
a S∆ b ⇐⇒ ∀m,n ≥ 0, IF b is justified w.r.t. S
THEN a is justified w.r.t. S.
We showcase applications of this definition in Section 5.
4.2 Existence and computation
We focus now on the two following questions: do the seman-
tics of Definition 9 always exist? And how can they be com-
puted? Firstly, we state that a variant of Dung’s fundamental
lemma [Dung, 1995] holds for graded admissibility.
Theorem 1 (Fundamental lemma). Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be an
AF, and assume: (1) X ⊆ A is an mn-admissible extension
of ∆; (2) x ∈ dm
n
(X); (3) n ≥ m. Then X ∪ {x} is mn-
admissible.
The assumption n ≥ m plays a crucial role in the proof
of Theorem 1, which we omit for space reasons, and indi-
cates that some graded semantics might not always exist if
n < m. By means of example, assume the AF ∆ consist-
ing only of the arguments and attacks in Figure 1iii). Then
∆ has no 21-complete (and hence no 21-grounded or 21-
preferred) extensions. To see this, observe that d∗2
1
(∅) = X
= {a3, b3, c3, d3, e3}, but X * n2(X) since X contains two
attacks on a3, that is, X is not 2-conflict-free.
However, provided that n ≥ m the standard arguments for
the existence of complete, grounded and preferred extensions
[Dung, 1995] carry over to their graded variants (based on
Fact 1). In particular, Fact 1 implies that if n ≥ m, then
the mn-admissible extensions form a complete partial order2
w.r.t. set inclusion, and so every admissible extension is a
subset of a maximal under set inclusion mn-admissible (i.e.,
mn-preferred) extension (by Zorn’s lemma, cf. [Baumann
and Spanring, 2015]). Hence if X is mn-admissible, then
checking whether x ∈ dm
n
(X) amounts to checking whether
x belongs to a mn-preferred extension. In addition, Fact 1
gives us some ground to sketch how graded semantics can be
computed by fixpoint approximation:
Theorem 2. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be a finitary AF , X ⊆ A be
an mn-admissible extension and n ≥ m. Then d∗m
n
(X) is the
smallest mn-complete extension containing X .
Corollary 1. Let ∆ = 〈A,〉 be a finitary AF , and n ≥ m.
Then d∗m
n
(∅) is the mn-grounded extension of ∆.
2See [Davey and Priestley, 1990, Ch. 8] for a definition.
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Figure 3: An AF with two preferred extensions
Corollary 1 allows us to compute the grounded extension
when n ≥ m. Also, Theorem 2 implies that if we choose a
‘large enough’ mn-admissible set X then d∗m
n
(X) will yield
an mn-preferred extension when n ≥ m. Referring to Figure
3’s AF : d1
2
(∅) = {d, f, g}; d1
2
({d, f, g}) = {d, f, g}. Hence
{d, f, g} is the 12-grounded extension.
The above results suggest that among Definition 9’s graded
semantics, only those for which n ≥ m are well-behaved in
that they retain the basic characteristics—dependent on the
fundamental lemma—of Dung’s original semantics. This is
an interesting finding and fits well with our guiding intuition
that one obtains higher justifiability when defenders are many
and attackers few. When this ratio is inverted, with attack-
ers outnumbering defenders, then justifiability criteria (exten-
sions) may altogether cease to exist.
Note finally that Theorem 2 reveals a precise relation
between the ranking of arguments w.r.t. iterated application
of dm
n
to an admissible X in Definition 8, and the ranking
of arguments w.r.t well-behaved graded variants of Dung’s
semantics in Definition 10, given that iterated applications of
graded defense yield the graded extensions.
5 Applying Graded Semantics
We now illustrate applications of the framework for deciding
between preferred extensions of abstract frameworks, and for
instantiations of the structured ASPIC+ framework.
Firstly, consider Figure 3. Its AF has two preferred
extensions—X1 and X2—under the standard Dung seman-
tics. This equates with X1 and X2 both being 11-preferred
extensions in the graded terminology. However, only X2 is
subsumed by a 12-preferred extension.3 Hence b is justified
under 12-preferred whereas a is not. Indeed, it is the case that
∀m,n ≥ 0, if a is justified under mn-preferred, so is b, but
not vice versa. Hence b preferred∆ a. We can thus use graded
semantics to arbitrate between arguments. Traditionally, an
exogenously given preference [Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002;
Modgil and Prakken, 2013] is used to arbitrate between such
arguments, whereas we show one can employ information
that is already available in standard AFs for that purpose.
We now consider instantiations of the ASPIC+ [Modgil
and Prakken, 2013] framework. ASPIC+ formalises logic-
3That is, X2 is 12-admissible whereas X1 is not.
based accounts of reasoning with schemes and critical ques-
tions [Walton, 1996]. For example, consider an argument c
for ‘invading Syria’ which reasons that since ‘Assad is sup-
pressing Syrians’, invasion will ‘remove Assad from power’,
achieving ‘Syrian democracy’ and so promoting ‘peace’.
Consider then the critical questions addressed by two AS-
PIC+ arguments a1 and a2 (in their simplified propositional
representation below) attacking argument c.
Specifically, let {e1, e2, e3, s1, s2, s3} be premises and
e1, s1⇒ ¬g ; e2, s2⇒ ¬g ; e3, s3⇒ g defeasible inference
rules, where e1, e2 and e3 respectively denote that the Insti-
tute for War Studies (WS), Arab League (AL), and United
Nations (UN) are experts on middle east affairs. s1 (s2) de-
notes that ‘the WS (AL) state that removing Assad will not
achieve democracy’, s3 denotes that ‘the UN states that re-
moving Assad will achieve democracy’, and g denotes that
‘removing Assad will achieve democracy’. We then have the
AF ∆ with the following arguments (we ignore representa-
tions of c and the set of arguments X built from the premises
alone, such as [e1], [s1], [e2] etc):
a1 = [e1; s1; e1, s1 ⇒ ¬g] and a2 = [e2; s2; e2, s2 ⇒ ¬g]
and a3 = [e3; s3; e3, s3⇒ g], and attacks: a1↔ a3↔ a2.
Now recall the introductory ‘guilty suspect’ example of Sec-
tion 1. In that example two attacks on distinct premises ac-
crue to weaken the argument for guilt. In the current example,
a1 and a2 attack c on the same premise (assumption4), and
(as illustrated with the rejected arguments in Example 3) is
weaker when attacked by both a1 and a2, than by only one of
a1 or a2. c’s weakened status can be seen to account for the
accrual of arguments (i.e., mutual strengthening) of a1 and
a2 in support of their common claim. Indeed, ∆ has two pre-
ferred extensions : E1 = {a1, a2}∪X and E2 = {a3, c}∪X .
However, under the graded semantics we obtain (abusing no-
tation) a1, a2 preferred∆ a3, c. Intuitively, a1 and a2 are
each defended by two arguments, whereas a3 and c are each
defended by only one argument.
The incompatibility of accrual with Dung’s standard theory
has been discussed and argued for in [Prakken, 2005]. Our
graded notion of acceptability partially challenges this view,
showing how a simple counting-based form of accrual can be
coherently accommodated within Dung’s theory.
6 Conclusions
Related work A few other works rank arguments based
solely on attacks. [Besnard and Hunter, 2001] also for-
malise intuitions similar to A1 and A2. However they do
not investigate these ideas in the context of Dung’s theory,
but do so only for acyclic graphs with deductive arguments.
Evaluation of arguments is achieved quantitatively through
a function (called a categoriser) v : A → [0, 1] defined as
v(a) = 11+
∑
a b v(b) , that assigns high values to arguments
with low-valued attackers (and the maximum value to un-
attacked arguments) and low values to arguments with high-
valued attackers. [Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] then
4ASPIC+ formalises asymmetric attacks on assumptions [Bo-
darenko et al., 1997] (in this case the assumption premise g used
in argument c).
generalises use of this function to Dung frameworks, and de-
velop (in their terms) a ‘local approach’ to valuation of argu-
ments that uses this function. A formal comparison between
categorisers and rankings obtainable through Definition 10
(or variants thereof) is certainly worth investigating. How-
ever [Cayrol and Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] then formalise a
‘global approach’ that they argue gives more intuitive out-
comes when ranking arguments. This approach requires a
highly involved processing of cyclical graphs that does not
lend itself to a systematic generalisation of Dung’s theory.
Furthermore, the global approach yields outcomes incompat-
ible with the intuition that the more the number of attacks the
weaker the argument (i.e., A1). For example, given AF1 =
c1→ b1→ b, c2→ b and AF2 = c3→ b′, then [Cayrol and
Lagasquie-Schiex, 2005] argue that b should be ranked higher
than b′ since “it has at least a defense whereas b′ has none”.
However our approach ranks b′ higher than b (both are d21 jus-
tified, but only b′ is d2n justified for n > 1). Intuitively, both b
and b′ are attacked by a single un-attacked argument (c2 and
c3 respectively). But then b is also attacked by b1, and even
though c1 defends this attack, b is (by A1) weaker than when
un-attacked (as illustrated also by the comparative ranking
of a1 and the un-attacked arguments in Figure 1vi)). Indeed,
more recently, [Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2013] also formalise
the intuition articulated by A1, as well as the intuition that an
argument retains a degree of justification when attacked by an
un-attacked argument. They develop two ranking-based se-
mantics, which they call discussion-based and burden-based,
satisfying some rationality principles they argue for. These
semantics are also based on the processing of attack paths
and their applicability relies on conjectures concerning the
processing of cyclical paths. How they relate to the standard
Dung’s semantics is unclear.
Finally, [Matt and Toni, 2008] and [Wu and Caminada,
2010] also present accounts of the degree to which an ar-
gument is acceptable. The former develops a very different
approach to ours, as it defines argument strength in terms of
the value of a repeated two-person zero-sum strategic game
with imperfect information. The latter refines the standard
notion of justifiability by isolating six different statuses of
arguments based on combinations of standard notions from
Dung’s theory (such as, belonging to or being attacked by the
grounded extension, belonging to some or no admissible sets,
and being attacked by some or no admissible sets) rather then
incorporating an idea of graduality in those notions.
To conclude we stress that the key distinguishing feature
of our work with respect to the above ones is that we ‘grade’
the justification status of arguments through a generalisation
of the body of notions and techniques of Dung’s theory, such
as defense/acceptability and extensions under all the standard
semantics. None of the above mentioned approaches devel-
ops a comparable generalisation.
Conclusions and future work We have paramaterised the
defense of an argument by the number of its attackers and de-
fenders. This yields rankings of defense functions and argu-
ments generalising the standard acceptability-based seman-
tics. We have applied these graded semantics to an instanti-
ated AF and shown how this integrates a simple form of ac-
crual with Dung’s theory. Other features of accrual [Prakken,
2005] are not captured by graded semantics, and a natural
question concerns the extent to which graded semantics can
shed light on the phenomenon of accrual. We will also look
to the development of graded defense functions and seman-
tics that capture further or alternative assumptions to A1 and
A2. For example, consider the principle A3 proposed in Sec-
tion 3.2. Also, some domains may warrant distinguishing
amongst arguments justified under the standard Dung seman-
tics, by assigning a higher ranking to those that have a higher
number of attacks. For example, consider that scientific theo-
ries establish their credibility to the extent that they success-
fully defend themselves against arguments attempting to re-
fute (attack) them. We believe the technical notions intro-
duced in this paper can be readily adapted to capture these
alternative intuitions under the same framework. Future work
should also evaluate our graded semantics with respect to ra-
tionality postulates for instantiated Dung frameworks [Cami-
nada and Amgoud, 2007], and postulates for ranking seman-
tics proposed in [Amgoud and Ben-Naim, 2013].
We conclude with a suggestive remark. The success of
Dung’s theory lies in its foundational approach to both com-
putational and (together with various extensions of the the-
ory) human argumentation [Modgil et al., 2013]. Regarding
the latter, [Rahwan et al., 2010] report that human subjects
have higher confidence in the claims of arguments that are
un-attacked, than when these arguments are subsequently at-
tacked and then defended. This finding fits with our graded
semantics assigning higher status to un-attacked arguments
than to defended arguments.
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